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Reconsidering Reconciliation: 
The Long Game 
Jeffery G. Hewitt* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Chief Justice McLachlin has identified reconciliation of the 
relationship between Canada and Aboriginal people as among the Court’s 
top priorities in the coming years,
1
 but has the Court prepared the way? 
Since the meaning of section 35, Constitution Act, 1982,
2
 continues to 
take shape and is central to reconciling the relationship between Canada 
and Aboriginal people, what do we mean by reconciliation?
3
 This paper 
explores some of the ways that Indigenous legal orders may offer 
assistance to the priority of reconciliation, not only in terms of 
potentially resolving issues within Aboriginal communities but also in 
terms of regulating relationships between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
                                                                                                                                  
*  This paper was prepared for the 17th Annual Constitution Cases Conference held at 
Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto, on April 11, 2014 and relates to broader 
questions relating to the legal relationship between Canada and Aboriginal people that I have been 
exploring since my arrival at law school in 1993. Conceptualizing reconciliation as founded on 
“equality of all peoples” as set out in the abstract and echoed throughout this paper, is based on 
Professor Patrick Macklem’s thesis in Indigenous Difference and the Constitution of Canada 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001). There are many people to thank for their review of 
early drafts of this paper and for their wise counsel. They are Professors Sonia Lawrence, Amar 
Bhatia, Dayna Scott, Bruce Ryder, John Borrows and the anonymous peer reviewers. I am also 
grateful for time spent as a McMurtry Fellow at Osgoode Hall Law School in 2013-2014 and being 
able to spend time with a faculty who has been so intellectually generous with me. 
1  See Joseph Brean, “‘Reconciliation’ with First Nations, not the Charter of Rights & 
Freedoms, will define the Supreme Court in coming years, Chief Justice says” National Post (March 13,  
2014), online: <http://news.nationalpost.com/2014/03/13/reconciliation-with-first-nations-not-the- 
charter-of-rights-freedoms-will-define-the-supreme-court-in-coming-years-chief-justice-says/>. 
2  Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Constitution”]. 
3  Both D. Newman, in “Reconciliation: Legal Conception(s) and Faces of Justice” in J.D. 
Whyte, ed., Moving Toward Justice: Legal Traditions and Aboriginal Justice (Saskatoon: Purich 
Publishing, 2008) [hereinafter “Newman”]; and T. Penikett, Reconciliation: First Nations Treaty 
Making in British Columbia (Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre, 2006) offer further insight into the 
question of reconciliation of Aboriginal people and the settler population within a Canadian legal 
framework.  
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communities. This paper also seeks to draw links between section 35(1) 
jurisprudence and Indigenous legal traditions based on a collection of 
scholarship reflecting on both the former and the latter.  
Though the word “reconciliation” is possessed of various definitions, 
uses and meanings,
4
 this paper considers Professor Mark Walters’ 
reconciliation as a relationship, which “involves sincere acts of mutual 
respect, tolerance and goodwill that serve to heal rifts and create the 
foundations for a harmonious relationship”,5 as the most hopeful vision 
of possibilities for Canada and Aboriginal people. Walters’ description of 
reconciliation as relationship
6
 assists in nuancing the broadly accepted 
technical legal definition of reconciliation “as the renewal of amicable 
relations between two persons who had been at enmity or variance; usually 
implying forgiveness of injuries on one or both sides”.7 In other words, 
reconciliation goes beyond reconciling Aboriginal title or Aboriginal 
economic interests with those of Canada and private enterprise.
8
 
Reconciliation is a means to bring balance to the relationship between 
Canada and Aboriginal people, which is too one-sided and has been tense 
for centuries.
9
 Given this, the road to reconciliation is a delicate one and 
must go beyond the merely symbolic.  
At the heart of the tension is the Crown’s insistence that it is sovereign 
over Aboriginal people.
10
 Indeed, since the passing of the Constitution  
Act, 1982, while the Court has made room for an “unprecedented degree of 
protection for certain ‘cultural’ practices within the state, it has 
nonetheless repeatedly and steadfastly refused to challenge the racist 
origin of Canada’s assumed sovereign authority over Indigenous peoples 
                                                                                                                                  
4  V. Napoleon, “Who Gets to Say What Happened: Reconciliation Issues for the Gitxsan” 
in C. Bell & D. Kahane, eds., Intercultural Dispute Resolution in Aboriginal Contexts (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2004). 
5  M. Walters, “The Jurisprudence of Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights in Canada” in  
W. Kymlicka & B. Bashir, eds., The Politics of Reconciliation in Multicultural Societies (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), Ch. 8, 165, at 170 [hereinafter “Walters”]. 
6  Id. 
7  Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th ed. (St. Paul, MN: Thomson Reuters, 2009). 
8  E. Ria Tzimas, “To What End the Dialogue?” in J. Cameron & B. Ryder, eds. (2011) 54 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 493, at 514 [hereinafter “Tzimas”], sets out concerns relating to the Crown’s framing 
of “reconciliation” as discussions merely addressing the negotiations of resource sharing or impact 
benefit agreement.  
9  For a discussion on the tension in the relationship between the Constitution and 
Aboriginal people, see J. Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism and Canada’s Constitution” in J. Cameron & S. 
Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 S.C.L.R. (2d) 351 [hereinafter “Borrows, ‘(Ab)Originalism’”]. 
10  K. McNeil, “The Meaning of Aboriginal Title” in M. Asch, ed., Aboriginal and Treaty 
Rights in Canada: Essays on Law, Equality, and Respect for Difference (Vancouver: UBC Press, 
1997) 135, at 137 [hereinafter “Asch”]. 
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and their territories”.11 Yet, the mere introduction of European-based 
laws did not supersede Aboriginal laws.
12
 Aboriginal people neither lost 
nor surrendered their right to continue to develop and maintain their own 
laws.
13
 Put another way, Aboriginal people have never been conquered.
14
 
Nonetheless, the Crown has assumed sovereign authority over Aboriginal 
people by means of historical fiction,
15
 which in some instances has been 
propped up by the Court.
16
 Given this difference of opinion between the 
Crown and Aboriginal people, is the Court able to utilize section 35 to 
achieve reconciliation? How is reconciliation to be guided by a Court 
that relies on laws that belong only to one party, and that are based on a 
colonial construct?  
                                                                                                                                  
11  G.S. Coulthard, “Subjects of Empire: Indigenous Peoples and the ‘Politics of Recognition 
in Canada” (2007) 6:4 Contemporary Political Theory 437, at 451.  
12  Connolly v. Woolrich, [1867] C.C.S. No. 32, 17 R.J.R.Q 75; Casimel v. Insurance Corp. 
of British Columbia, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1834, 106 D.L.R. (4th) 720 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Van der Peet, 
[1996] S.C.J. No. 77, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, at paras. 38-40 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Van der Peet”]; 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] S.C.J. No. 108, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010, at paras. 146-148 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Delgamuukw”] Mitchell v. Canada (M.N.R.), [2001] S.C.J. No. 33, [2001] 1 
S.C.R. 911, at paras. 9-10, 61-64, 141-154 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Mitchell”]. In addition, by 
“Aboriginal laws” I refer to the body of laws developed and maintained by Aboriginal peoples 
themselves not the body of law that is too frequently referred to as “Aboriginal law” meaning 
Canadian law as it applies to Aboriginal people. 
13  B. Slattery, “The Generative Structure of Aboriginal Rights” (2007) 38 S.C.L.R (2d) 595 
[hereinafter “Slattery, ‘Generative Structure’”].  
14  For an in-depth discussion on the meaning of sovereignty and Indigenous 
conceptualizations, see T. Alfred, “Sovereignty” in Joanne Barker, ed., Sovereignty Matters: 
Locations of Contestation and Possibility in Indigenous Struggles for Self-Determination (Lincoln, 
NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2006) 33. 
15  J. Borrows, “Wampum at Niagara: The Royal Proclamation, Canadian Legal History, and 
Self-government” [hereinafter “Borrows, ‘Wampum’”] in Asch, supra, note 10, 155, at 157:  
A First Nations perspective reflecting the view that they were not conquered was made 
by Minavavana, an Ojibwa chief from west of Manitoulin at Michilimackinac. 
Minavavana declared:  
Englishman, although you have conquered the French you have not yet 
conquered us! We are not your slaves. These lakes, these woods and mountains, 
were left to us by our ancestors. They are our inheritance; and we will part with 
them to none. 
16  B. Slattery, “Aboriginal Rights and the Honour of the Crown” (2005) 29 S.C.L.R. (2d) 433, 
at 434 and 437 [hereinafter “Slattery, ‘Honour of the Crown’”] wherein Slattery sets out the Court’s 
careful wording in Haida Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests), [2004] S.C.J. No. 70, 
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 511, 2004 SCC 73 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haida Nation”] and Taku River Tlingit 
First Nation v. British Columbia (Project Assessment Director), [2004] S.C.J. No. 69, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 550 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taku River”] to “avoid suggesting that the Crown gained 
sovereignty over Aboriginal peoples in a lawful or legitimate manner”. However, though the Court is 
cautious in its language, the decisions were careful to set out that Aboriginal people do not have a 
veto power to object to Crown action, which is not a relationship of equals but one that perpetuates 
Crown sovereign authority.  
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Interestingly, the way toward reconciliation does not lie solely within 
section 35 or within Aboriginal laws because “the law of aboriginal 
rights is neither entirely English nor aboriginal in origin: it is a form of 
intersocietal law that evolved from long-standing practices linking the 
various communities together”.17 An intersocietal approach to 
reconciliation then,
18
 is about creating an inclusive foundation for the 
“harmonious relationship” Walters refers to. The framework is something 
that is neither wholly of one or the other but which both parties are 
reflected in. This paper presents one Aboriginal model of reconciliation 
alongside section 35 jurisprudence as a means of “linking the various 
communities together” in a more inclusive approach toward reconciliation. 
Consider One Dish.
19
  
II. ONE DISH 
One Dish
20
 is an agreement between the Anishinabe and 
Haudenosaunee Confederacy
21
 who together, have something to teach 
about sharing. A boundary of fertile land between the two Nations, in 
                                                                                                                                  
17  Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13, at 595-97. 
18  For a further discussion on “intersocietal law” and the relationship between the Crown 
and Aboriginal people, see Slattery, id.; M.D. Walters, “The ‘Golden Thread’ of Continuity: 
Aboriginal Customs at Common Law and Under the Constitution Act, 1982” (1999) 44 McGill L.J. 
711; J. Borrows & L.I. Rotman, “The Sui Generis Nature of Aboriginal Rights: Does It Make a 
Difference?” (1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 9 [hereinafter “Borrows & Rotman”]; B. Slattery, “The Legal 
Basis of Aboriginal Title” in F. Cassidy, ed., Aboriginal Title in British Columbia: Delgamuukw v. 
The Queen (Lantzville, BC: Oolichan Books, 1992), at 120-21. 
19  L. Simpson, “Precolonial Nishnaabeg Diplomatic & Treaty Relationships” (2008) 23 
Wicazo SA Rev. 29, at 31-32. 
20  One Dish is one approach to reconciliation. This model was developed between the 
Haudenosaunee and the Anishinabe. Thus, it forms part of the legal traditions of those groups but not 
of all Indigenous nations, nor should it be taken as such. The Crown has the responsibility of dealing 
with all Indigenous groups and cannot simply take a singular pan-Aboriginal approach, which while 
easier and more convenient for the Crown is neither possible nor appropriate given the wide range of 
rich cultures, languages, laws and traditions of Indigenous peoples. This is part of the awesome 
responsibility the Crown took on by occupying the land and issuing the Royal Proclamation, 1763. 
Though reconciliation will be incredibly complicated, that is not a reason to continue to ignore it. 
That stated, I have been fortunate enough to have been given some teachings related to One Dish, so 
I speak to what I have been taught. I do not speak to all examples of Aboriginal approaches to 
reconciliation, though they continue to exist all around us. One Dish then, is illustrative of a 
structural approach different from the current colonial, hierarchical model and emphasizes a 
relationship between parties more than the particular rules.  
21  S.M. Hill, “Traveling Down the River of Life Together in Peace and Friendship, Forever: 
Haudenosaunee Land Ethics and Treaty Agreements as the Basis for Restructuring the Relationship 
with the British Crown” in L. Simpson, ed., Lighting the Eighth Fire: The Liberation, Resurgence 
and Protection of Indigenous Nations (Winnipeg, MB: Arbeiter Ring, 2008). 
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what is now southwestern Ontario, was shared by both Nations long 
before European contact.
22
 The Anishinabe and Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy are not possessed of a common language, culture or laws. 
However, after over 50 years of a widespread and brutal war, they 
reconciled their differences for the benefit of both parties and restored 
peace to a region that suffered from disharmony in disagreements over 
lands and resources.
23
 Similarly, lands and resources form the basis of 
many disputes between Aboriginal people and Canada. How did the 
parties to One Dish find resolution? Laws were established defining the 
ways by which resources would be shared and the land was managed 
together. Known to the Anishinabe as “One Dish”,24 a wampum belt25 
was created as a means to transmit these laws to the people living on the 
land. It was understood that the relationship would continue in perpetuity 
— and it is still recognized today.26 The Dish in the wampum belt 
symbolized the understanding that both Nations would share the bounty 
of the land without interference in the other’s sovereignty. Further, for 
the Haudenosaunee, the spoon in the bowl in contrast to a knife, 
represented peace.
27
 Adherence to the One Dish agreement required 
ongoing diplomatic relations through the exchange of gifts and ceremony 
as a means of regular renewal and to ensure peaceful co-existence.
28
 One 
Dish is demonstrative of respect and offers the basis of a workable model 
                                                                                                                                  
22  Victor P. Lytwyn, “A Dish with One Spoon: The Shared Hunting Grounds Agreement in 
the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Valley Region” in David H. Pentland, ed., Papers of the 28th 
Algonquian Conference (Winnipeg, MB: University of Manitoba, 1997) 210 [hereinafter “Lytwyn”]. 
23  For more on the severe nature of the conflict between these two nations that led to the 
One Dish agreement, see P.S. Schmalz, The Ojibwa of Southern Ontario (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 1991). 
24  Alan Corbiere, Project Coordinator of Kinoomaadoog at M’Chigeeng First Nation, as 
presented in Rama First Nation, October 2013 [hereinafter “Corbiere”]. In his presentation, Alan 
notes this treaty is called “Gdoo-naaganinaa” by the Anishinabe, meaning “Our Dish”. To the 
Haudenosaunee this treaty is known as the “Dish with One Spoon”. Alan Corbiere used a replica in 
his presentation and advised that the original wampum belt for the treaty is housed in the Royal 
Ontario Museum in Toronto. 
25  Like a document or written record, wampum belts are read and used for the transmission 
of knowledge. For more on wampum belts, see K.V. Muller, “The Two ‘Mystery’ Belts of Grand 
River: A Biography of the Two Row Wampum and the Friendship Belt” (2007) 31:1 The American 
Indian Quarterly 129; M.J. Becker & J. Lainey, “Wampum Belts With Initials and/or Dates as 
Design Elements: A Preliminary Review of One Subcategory of Political Belts” (2004) 28:2 
American Indian Culture and Research Journal 25. 
26  J. Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2010), at 133 [hereinafter “Borrows, Indigenous Constitution”]. 
27  Corbiere, supra, note 24. I offer here only a summary of Alan Corbiere’s reading of the 
One Dish wampum. Given the sacred nature of the story, it is not being shared in its entirety.  
28  Id. 
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for sharing territory and resources while maintaining an agreement of 
non-interference in the sovereignty of others. It was a singular law that 
was not purely Anishinabe or Haudenosaunee, yet it belonged to and was 
maintained by both.
29
  
The formation of One Dish required careful attention to creating the 
best conditions for reconciliation. The negotiations between two very 
different peoples required what most successful negotiations require: 
mutual respect, sharing and responsibility.
30
 This stands in stark contrast 
to the unilateral and hierarchical Crown assertion of sovereignty that is 
too often taken for granted and which continues to form the basis for 
most Crown/Aboriginal negotiations. One Dish illustrates what these  
two Nations
31
 thought a nation-to-nation relationship should be
32
 even as 
discussions ensued with the Crown leading to the Royal Proclamation, 
1763.
33
 The relationships created between the Crown and Aboriginal 
people in this period diverged completely from the One Dish model, 
ushering in an ongoing era of imbalance, tension and conflict still 
seeking reconciliation. 
III. DIVERGENCE 
1.  But That Was Then ...  
In order to move forward and close the distance between Canada and 
Aboriginal people, consider how we arrived here. As the French and the 
English fought for control over lands in North America, both European 
powers sought, and were given, alliances with Aboriginal people. Later, 
                                                                                                                                  
29  For an in-depth chronicle of Aboriginal power and identity, see M. Witgen, An Infinity of 
Nations: How the Native New World Shaped Early North America (Philadelphia, PA: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 2011), Ch. 2.  
30  Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples in Looking Forward, Looking 
Back, Vol. 1 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996), “The Basic Principles”, Ch. 16 
[hereinafter “Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples”]; also see J. Tully, Public Philosophy in a 
New Key: Volume I, Democracy and Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Ch. 7, 
“The Negotiation of Reconciliation” , at 223. 
31  One Dish was agreed to between the Haudenosaunee and Anishinabek in Sault Ste. Marie 
in 1701: Lytwyn, supra, note 22. To that end, it would have been maintained and within the cultural 
and legal construction of both Nations when considering the means by which to create a new 
relationship with the Crown.  
32  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 170. 
33  Reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 1 [hereinafter “Proclamation”]. 
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the Treaty of Paris formalized the English victory over the French,
34
 
though not over Aboriginal people, and gave the English control over 
some of the lands now forming Canada without considering the pre-
existing relationship of Aboriginal people to these same lands.
35
 
Moreover, the post-war era quickly gave way to a growing settler 
population, predictably leading to land-based conflicts with Aboriginal 
people. This created a complication for the Crown. Aboriginal peoples’ 
military prowess in response to settler encroachment threatened the 
Crown’s expansion further into North America.36 The Crown 
subsequently concluded that Aboriginal rights must be formally 
acknowledged.
37
 The result was a royal decree, which sprouted the 
colonial seed from which the relationship between Canada and 
Aboriginal people struggles to grow.
38
 The Crown’s colonial-based 
superiority was imbedded in Canada centuries ago
39
 with the words of 
the Royal Proclamation, 1763:
40
  
And whereas it is just and reasonable, and essential to our Interest, and 
the Security of our Colonies, that the several Nations or Tribes of 
Indians with whom We are connected, and who live under our 
Protection, should not be molested or disturbed in the Possession of 
such Parts of Our Dominions and Territories as, not having been ceded 
to or purchased by Us, are reserved to them, or any of them, as their 
Hunting Grounds. ... 
And whereas great Frauds and Abuses have been committed in 
purchasing Lands of the Indians, to the great Prejudice of our Interests 
and to the great Dissatisfaction of the said Indians; In order, therefore, 
to prevent such Irregularities for the future, and to the end that the 
Indians may be convinced of our Justice and determined Resolution to 
remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent. …41 
In order to “remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent” of the 
“Nations or Tribes of Indians”, the Crown proclaims that it alone is in 
charge of the relationship with Aboriginal people, a position which 
                                                                                                                                  
34  M. Asch, On Being Here To Stay: Treaties and Aboriginal Rights in Canada (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2014), at 153 [hereinafter “Asch, Here to Stay”]. 
35  Borrows, “Wampum”, supra, note 15, at 157. 
36  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 133.  
37  Id. 
38  J. Borrows, “With or Without You: First Nations Laws (in Canada)” (1996) 41 McGill L.J. 629. 
39  B. Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727. 
40  Proclamation, supra, note 33. 
41  Id. 
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continues to be reflected in subsequent jurisprudence and a barrier to 
achieving reconciliation. At its best the language of the Royal 
Proclamation illustrates a relationship of close proximity with Aboriginal 
people and acknowledges Aboriginal title by stating that land must either 
have been purchased from Aboriginal people through sale to the Crown 
or for such lands not purchased, remain available for Aboriginal people.
42
 
Conversely, it also categorizes Aboriginal people as dependent
43
 and 
living under Crown protection from the Crown’s own citizenry44 — all 
neatly accomplished with a few choice words.  
Still, opportunity for the Crown to maintain honest relations 
presented itself a year later in 1764, when 24 Aboriginal Nations 
gathered with the Crown at Niagara.
45
 Runners were sent to all the 
Aboriginal people living in the region.
46
 No Nation in the area was left 
out because the gathering was foundationally important to everyone 
living on the land. Here, “a nation-to-nation relationship between settler 
and First Nation peoples was renewed and extended ... The Royal 
Proclamation became a treaty at Niagara because it was presented by 
colonialists for affirmation, and was accepted by First Nations.”47  
The Aboriginal perspective on nation-to-nation relationships, 
including the implication of respect, meant that each party came to the 
agreement with its own customs, traditions and laws, as would be 
expected of and respected by any other nation. Note too, that like the 
Royal Proclamation, the Treaty of Niagara acknowledged the renewal 
and extension of alliances
48
 already in existence prior to this treaty-
making event.
49
 The parties were known to each other. There was an 
expectation of ongoing maintenance. In these ways, the Treaty of 
Niagara was reflective of the inclusive spirit of the relationship 
                                                                                                                                  
42  J. Borrows “Constitutional Law from a First Nation Perspective: Self-Government and 
the Royal Proclamation” (1994) 28 U.B.C.L. Rev. 1-47. 
43  Id. 
44  Borrows, “Wampum”, supra, note 15. 
45  For a more in-depth relating of events surrounding the Treaty of Paris and its subsequent 
implementation in Canada, as well as an accounting of the Treaty of Niagara, see C.G. Calloway, The 
Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America (Oxford University Press, 2006). 
46  Borrows, “Wampum”, supra, note 15, at 162. 
47  Id., at 161. 
48  Id. 
49  Over the years, treaty-making has continued as a Crown practice in Canada since 1764 
with varying degrees of activity and has resulted in hundreds of agreements, many of which, as 
Borrows notes in Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 133, “draw on some form of Indigenous 
legal tradition”, demonstrating in the historical record a practice of taking an intersocietal approach 
in the relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal people.  
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Aboriginal people believed was described in the Royal Proclamation.
50
 
The Crown did not see the Royal Proclamation in the same way. But 
context and perspective matters.  
With respect to the Proclamation, “using the written words of the 
document alone [t]o interpret the principles of the Proclamation ... would 
conceal First Nations perspectives and inappropriately privilege one 
culture’s practice over another”.51 This is precisely what has happened. 
The Royal Proclamation became the Crown’s justification for its 
assertion of sovereignty over Aboriginal people and the Crown’s taking 
of lands in order to make room for the settler population. Thus, 
settlement and Confederation transpired by ignoring the Aboriginal 
understanding of the relationship and subverting both the rights and title 
of Aboriginal people. This sleight of hand is reinforced in jurisprudence 
insofar as “Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title”.52 
Therein, history holds the invention of Crown sovereignty, which both 
ran roughshod over the perspective of Aboriginal people and has been 
supported by the Courts. Moreover, the subsequent failure of the law to 
place the Proclamation in context has germinated centuries of broken 
promises and mistrust. Unsurprisingly, reconciling the vast distance 
between Canada and Aboriginal people is complicated.
53
  
2.  And This Is Now ... 
Land disputes between Aboriginal people and the settler population 
continue still. Contemporary law regarding Aboriginal title continues to 
refer to the Proclamation. For instance, in Calder v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General)
54
 — a title case about lands historically occupied by 
the Nisga’a people in British Columbia — elements of the Proclamation 
are echoed in law over two centuries later. In response to years of Crown 
denial of the existence of Aboriginal title,
55
 the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                                  
50  Borrows, “Wampum”, supra, note 15, at 162. 
51  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26. 
52  Delgamuukw, supra, note 12. 
53  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, Ch. 1. 
54  [1973] S.C.J. No. 56, [1973] S.C.R. 313 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Calder”]. 
55  Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, [2014] S.C.J. No. 44, 2014 SCC 44 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Tsilhqot’in”] has recently been decided by the Supreme Court of Canada. This case 
involved questions of Aboriginal title and challenged the Crown’s position that if the Tsilhqot’in 
people hold Aboriginal title then is it limited to small plots of land that the people have inhabited 
consistently (this is known as the “postage-stamp” theory of Aboriginal title and is a continued 
attempt to limit Aboriginal title). The Tsilhqot’in on the other hand, claimed title over a much larger 
 
268 SUPREME COURT LAW REVIEW (2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) 
determined that there is such a thing after all.
56
 In response to Calder, the 
Crown revived its treaty-making practice through a comprehensive land-
claims policy as a means to achieve settlement with respect to Aboriginal 
title.
57
 This shift in law and subsequent Crown policy
58
 illustrates the 
same duality in the Crown’s agenda as we saw in the simultaneous desire 
to both protect and dominate Aboriginal people via the wording of the 
Royal Proclamation. On one hand, the policy puts negotiation, not 
protracted litigation, at the forefront of the Crown/Aboriginal 
relationship and led to the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement.
59
 
To this extent, a negotiated resolution is preferred because it at least 
allows for the possibility that both parties will learn something from each 
other and share a commonly owned resolution. On the other, Crown 
policy requires an exchange of Aboriginal peoples’ surrender of any 
claims to Aboriginal title (both current and future), for the settler 
population’s certainty about their own land rights. This modern-day 
practice is hardly demonstrative of the Aboriginal understanding of the 
“nation-to-nation” relationship entered into at Niagara in 1764 as equals.  
The Crown’s colonialist scheme can also be felt in R. v. Sparrow60 — a 
challenge to a Fisheries Act prosecution based on an Aboriginal right to fish 
— which offered the Court its first opportunity to interpret section 35(1). 
The Court declared that Aboriginal rights not extinguished prior to 1982 
were protected from subsequent Crown extinguishment, which was merely 
                                                                                                             
area, namely, their traditional territory, and were successful on their arguments both at trial and in 
the Supreme Court of Canada. Though Tsilhqot’in was not decided at the time this paper was 
originally written, the Court’s decision is consistent with the author’s premise that reconciliation 
requires more than mere capitulation on the part of Aboriginal peoples in favour of the settler 
population. The recalibration set out in Tsilhqot’in holds the potential to be both a considerable and 
positive shift toward reconciliation by creating opportunity for federal and provincial Crowns, 
private enterprise and Aboriginal people to come together in agreement on land and resource 
development in more cooperative ways or risk future protracted litigation.  
56  Newman, supra, note 3. 
57  K. McNeil, Common Law Aboriginal Title (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989). 
58  K. McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening” (2006) 69 
Sask. L. Rev. 282. 
59  The James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement (“JBQNA”) was the first treaty in 
Canada since the 1920s, when the Crown stopped its practice of treaty-making. For a considered 
example relating to the effectiveness of co-management and joint decision-making elements between 
the Crown and the James Bay Cree based on the terms of the JBQNA, see J. Webber & C.H. Scott, 
“Conflicts Between Cree Hunting and Sporting Hunting: Co-Management Decision Making at 
James Bay” in C. Scott, ed., Aboriginal Autonomy and Development in Northern Quebec and 
Labrador (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011); and E.J. Peters, “Native People and the Environmental 
Regime in the James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement” (1999) 52:4 Arctic 395. 
60  [1990] S.C.J. No. 49, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sparrow”]. 
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an affirmation of the wording already contained within section 35.
61
 Further, 
the Court took a restrictive approach and ruled that the exercise of those 
rights could be subject to regulatory infringement in certain circumstances.
62
 
This is inconsistent with both the 1764 Aboriginal perspective at Niagara, 
which envisaged as a relationship of equals, and the wording of the Royal 
Proclamation that acknowledged Aboriginal title long before 1982. The 
Proclamation has never been overturned. The Treaty of Niagara has never 
been revoked. Yet, the Court in Sparrow propped up the long-refuted 
position by Aboriginal people that the Crown acquired sovereignty by 
legitimate or lawful means.
63
 Canadian Courts have affirmed this principle 
explicitly and implicitly, over and over again,
64
 as though the more it is 
repeated the more true it becomes.
65
 Adopting a narrow view in Sparrow,
 
the 
Court missed an opportunity
66
 to investigate the meaning of the Royal 
Proclamation and offer a more fully contextualized account of its meaning, 
which recognizes both the Crown and Aboriginal peoples’ perspectives.  
Sparrow cleared the way for another decision promoting colonial 
hierarchy, R. v. Van der Peet.
67
 Here, by characterizing Aboriginal rights 
as historical,
68
 the Court charted a course towards constraining 
Aboriginal rights
69
 by recognizing only those rights that were “integral to 
                                                                                                                                  
61  K. McNeil, “The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada” (1982) 4 
S.C.L.R. 255, at 257 [hereinafter “McNeil, ‘Constitutional Rights’”]. 
62  K. McNeil, “How Can Infringements of the Constitutional Rights of Aboriginal Peoples 
Be Justified?” (1996) 8:2 Const. Forum Const. 33. 
63  J. Borrows, “Domesticating Doctrines: Aboriginal Peoples after the Royal Commission” 
(2001) 46 McGill L.J. 615. 
64  As set out in note 55, supra, the most recent articulation of this by the Crown is found in the 
postage-stamp theory of Aboriginal title argued in Tsilhqot’in, which was rejected in the trial decision 
and again by the Supreme Court of Canada. The Supreme Court ultimately found that the Tsilhqot’in 
proved Aboriginal title to their traditional lands. This movement by the Supreme Court further away 
from a wholesale acceptance of Crown sovereignty (as Slattery points out in “Honour of the Crown”, 
supra, note 16, in Haida Nation, supra, note 16, the Court shifts its language of “acquisition” of Crown 
sovereignty toward “assertion”), may be indicative of the Court’s efforts to calibrate the relationship in 
contemplation of reconciliation. Tsilhqot’in and Haida Nation, however, against repeated interpretations 
of Crown sovereignty relating to the Royal Proclamation and again in Calder, supra, note 54; Sparrow, 
supra, note 60; Van der Peet, supra, note 12, Gladstone, infra, note 71, and others, does not necessarily 
mean that the shift needed to achieve reconciliation is complete.  
65  J. Borrows, “Sovereignty’s Alchemy: An Analysis of Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” 
(1999) 37 Osgoode Hall L.J. 537.  
66  M. Asch & P. Macklem, “Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Sovereignty: An Essay on  
R. v. Sparrow” (1991) 9 Alta. L. Rev. 498. 
67  Van der Peet, supra, note 12. This case was about an Aboriginal commercial right to sell fish.  
68  Slattery, “Honour of the Crown”, supra, note 16, at 595. 
69  R.L. Barsh & J. (Sa’ke’j) Youngblood Henderson, “The Supreme Court’s Van der Peet 
Trilogy: Naïve Imperialism and Ropes of Sand” (1997) 42 McGill L.J. 993 [hereinafter “Barsh & 
Youngblood Henderson”]. 
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the distinctive cultures” of Aboriginal people — meaning the Aboriginal 
right must be central to the culture, have existed pre-contact and be 
continuous in order to be legitimated in Canadian law.
70
 Put a different 
way, no matter how long or consistently an Aboriginal group has been 
hunting and fishing, these activities may not necessarily be deemed an 
Aboriginal constitutional right since all societies have a need to feed 
themselves, not just Aboriginal ones.  
R. v. Gladstone
71
 — released alongside Van der Peet — further 
constricts Aboriginal rights.
72
 In this case, “reconciliation became a 
vehicle for infringement in the name of non-aboriginal appeasement”.73 
Thus, in Van der Peet and Gladstone we see that  section 35(1) is a 
constitutional effort to hierarchically organize Aboriginal rights 
underneath Crown sovereignty rather than engage with the ways that 
Aboriginal rights could be reconciled with the existence and needs of the 
settlers.
74
 If there was any doubt, the Court made the point clear by 
stating that section 35(1) “provides the constitutional framework for 
reconciliation of the pre-existence of distinctive aboriginal societies 
occupying the land with Crown sovereignty”.75 Given the Crown’s long-
standing position on sovereignty, the tests in Van der Peet and Gladstone 
should not have come as a surprise, nor should the Court’s view of 
section 35(1) as part of the colonial apparatus to disrupt Aboriginal rights 
and title. Such an approach renders the Constitution a tool of subversion 
of Aboriginal rights.
76
 Taken together, the decisions assist in solidifying 
the Crown’s sense of its legitimacy and do not lend themselves to hope 
of reconciliation so long as this fundamental flaw persists.  
                                                                                                                                  
70  Slattery, “Honour of the Crown”, supra, note 16. 
71  [1996] S.C.J. No. 79, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Gladstone”], regarding a 
modification of the test in Sparrow, which gives increased deference to the Crown in protecting the 
Crown’s commercial fishing rights.  
72  Barsh & Youngblood Henderson, supra, note 69. 
73  D. Johnston, Preface, in C. Bell & R.K. Patterson, eds., Protection of First Nation 
Cultural Heritage: Laws, Policy and Reform (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2009). 
74  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, Ch. 5. 
75  Van der Peet, supra, note 12, at para. 42.  
76  Id., at para. 31: 
More specifically, what s. 35(1) does is provide the constitutional framework through 
which the fact that aboriginals lived on the land in distinctive societies, with their own 
practices, traditions and cultures, is acknowledged and reconciled with the sovereignty of 
the Crown. The substantive rights which fall within the provision must be defined in light 
of this purpose; the aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1) must be directed 
towards the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty 
of the Crown. 
(2014), 67 S.C.L.R. (2d) RECONSIDERING RECONCILIATION 271 
If Sparrow sweeps aside recognition of Aboriginal rights and title in the 
Royal Proclamation yet supports the acquisition of Crown sovereignty,
77
 and 
Van der Peet limits Aboriginal rights in favour of non-Aboriginal interests,
78
 
why should Aboriginal people seek to reconcile? The relationship is so 
fraught with fundamental power imbalances.
79
 Why should Aboriginal 
people expend resources pursuing agreements with the Crown when the 
outcomes are so heavily stacked in the Crown’s favour?80 This set-up is not 
reflective of Walters’ “reconciliation as relationship” paradigm. With the 
Crown’s power advantage, why should reconciliation matter to anyone? Part 
of the answer may be found in Delgamuukw.
81
  
In this decision, then Chief Justice Lamer described in wider terms 
the same relationship his Court had restrained a year earlier in Van der 
Peet and Gladstone when he concluded:  
... Ultimately, it is through negotiated settlements, with good faith and 
give and take on all sides, reinforced by the judgments of this Court, 
that we will achieve what I stated in Van der Peet, supra, at para. 31, to 
be a basic purpose of section 35(1) – “the reconciliation of the pre-
existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of the Crown.” 
Let us face it, we are all here to stay.
82
 
And therein lies the rub. No one is going anywhere. Aboriginal 
people and the settler population are all here to stay.
83
 Is it not preferable 
to smooth things out so our time together is less discordant? This is 
something greater than a quaint notion because “the culture of law is 
weakened in the country as a whole if Indigenous peoples’ legal 
                                                                                                                                  
77  Asch, Here to Stay, supra, note 34.  
78  J. Rudin, “One Step Forward, Two Steps Back – The Political and Institutional Dynamics 
Behind the Supreme Court of Canada’s Decisions in R. v. Sparrow, R. v. Van der Peet and 
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia” (1998) 13 J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 67. 
79  For discussion on balancing Aboriginal people’s right to govern as a third order of 
government in Canada, see the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30, Vol. 2  
at 163-244. 
80  S. Lawrence & P. Macklem, “From Consultation to Reconciliation: Aboriginal Rights 
and the Crown’s Duty to Consult” (2000) 79 Can. Bar Rev. 252; S. Imai, “Sound Science, Careful 
Policy Analysis and Ongoing Relationships: Integrating Litigation and Negotiation in Aboriginal 
Lands and Resources Disputes” (2003) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 587; Slattery, “Generative Structure”, 
supra, note 13. 
81  Delgamuukw, supra, note 12. Though the Court did not make a decision on Aboriginal 
title, this case does, however, set out the test for title — which was found to be a “burden on the 
Crown”. The Court also found the important value of oral history of Aboriginal peoples as being on 
par with written history.  
82  Id., at para. 186 (emphasis added). 
83  Asch, Here to Stay, supra, note 34, at 152-55. 
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traditions are excluded from its matrix … [n]ot only do we lose the 
wisdom they could provide about how to organize relationships … but 
we also fail to attend to the underlying injustice of Canada’s creation and 
development.”84 Thus, quality relationships matter to the well-being of 
the country. Yet, how can there be a reasonable expectation of 
reconciliation “through negotiated settlements with good faith”, if good 
faith comes in limited doses
85
 and both parties often see themselves as 
oppositional?
86
 How does that conversation even start?
87
 It begins with 
letting go of imperialism and snipping the root of colonial supremacy. It 
begins by creating something uniquely Canadian, something 
intersocietal.
88
 It is seen with the Court’s own shift away from its 
reasoning in Van der Peet to Delgamuukw and when it subsequently and 
more expressly rearticulated the purpose of section 35 as a broader 
“reconciliation of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians in a 
mutually respectful long-term relationship”.89  
IV. A MADE IN “CANADA” APPROACH 
One Dish, in my view, required four elements for success, which 
when taken together offer an Aboriginal contribution
90
 to what is either 
                                                                                                                                  
84  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 122.  
85  For a justification of the Crown’s limited investment in negotiations, see T. Flanagan, 
First Nations? Second Thoughts (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press 2000); for more on 
Crown self-imposed limited interest in resolution of specific claims with Aboriginal people (i.e., 
lands admittedly wrongfully taken by the Crown for which compensation will be negotiated only 
with the Crown under terms established by the Crown in its own policy), see <http://www.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/eng/1100100030501/1100100030506>.  
86  For critiques of oppositional positioning between the Crown and Aboriginal people, see 
M. Sinclair, “Aboriginal People and Euro-Canadians: Two World Views” in J.H. Hylton, ed., 
Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada: Current Trends and Issues (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 
1994) 19; M.E. Turpel, “Home/Land” (1991-1992) 10 Can. J. Fam. L. 17. 
87  Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13, suggests “the essence of aboriginal 
rights lies in their bridging of aboriginal and non-aboriginal cultures, so that the law of aboriginal 
rights is neither entirely English nor aboriginal in origin”. This is significant in that perhaps a 
conversation starts between two seemingly disparate parties by finding resolution that is something 
new; somewhat familiar and meaningful to both, yet formed neither wholly of one nor of the other.  
88  J. Webber, “Relations of Force and Relations of Justice: The Emergence of Normative 
Community between Colonists and Aboriginal Peoples” (1995) 33 Osgoode Hall L.J. 623 
[hereinafter “Webber”]. 
89  Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] S.C.J. No. 53, 2010 SCC 53, 
[2010] 3 S.C.R. 103, at para. 10 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Little Salmon/Carmacks”]. 
90  There are many Aboriginal contributions to reconciliation, which vary by region and 
Nation. One Dish is one example, although it is not the only one even among the Anishinabe or 
Haudenosaunee. It is the one that these two Nations created together in 1701. 
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already present in or arising from section 35 jurisprudence, thereby 
creating a basis for giving meaning to intersocietal law as a vehicle for 
reconciliation.  
1.  Honour 
Enter the doctrine of honour.
91
 In order for there to be a working 
relationship and adherence to any agreement — as demonstrated by the 
vast boundary and resource sharing between the Anishinabe and the 
Haudenosaunee — following the terms of the agreement itself requires 
good conduct and at its deepest base, honour. Applying the Van der Peet 
test in a broader sense, it may be said that “honour” is an integral part of 
all human societies, not a particular or distinct custom of either 
Aboriginal people or the Crown, and thereby an intersocietal value. 
Further, as set out as recently as Manitoba Metis Federation Inc. v. 
Canada (Attorney General),
92
 the doctrine of honour of the Crown is 
both substantive and inclusive for the Crown’s dealings with Aboriginal 
peoples.
93
 The Court’s recognition of the importance and weight of this 
doctrine is helpful when considering a One Dish approach. Yet the 
continued unilateral assumption of sovereignty in the Court’s 
jurisprudence, whether acquired or asserted,
94
 and the ongoing Court-
sanctioned subversion of Aboriginal rights and title in favour of those of 
the settler population imports a one-sided superiority that One Dish 
rejects. In order to move toward Walters’ conceptualization of 
reconciliation, the current inequality between the rights and title of 
Aboriginal people and the rights of the settler population must be 
levelled off.  
In Delgamuukw,
95
 the Court further entrenched colonial order by stating 
that Aboriginal title is a burden on the Crown’s underlying title.96 Continued 
acceptance of Crown sovereignty subordinates Aboriginal title
97
 and 
                                                                                                                                  
91  Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13; Newman, supra, note 3.  
92  [2013] S.C.J. No. 14, 2013 SCC 14, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 623 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Manitoba 
Metis”]; for another recent case on the doctrine of honour, see also Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte v. 
Canada, [2013] F.C.J. No. 741, 2013 FC 669 (F.C.).  
93  Manitoba Metis, id., at paras. 70 and 94. 
94  Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13.  
95  Delgamuukw, supra, note 12.  
96  Id., at 1098, per Lamer C.J.C. 
97  B. Slattery, “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar Rev. 255; 
Webber, supra, note 88; Borrows & Rotman, supra, note 18.  
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understandably riles Aboriginal people.
98
 Such a fundamental imbalance
99
 
does not beget a fair and principled relationship that is sustainable.
100
 In an 
effort to smooth out the rough edges, the Court offers up the doctrine of 
honour as a starting point.
101
 While the Court establishes honour as a feature 
of how the Crown must conduct itself in all of its dealings with Aboriginal 
people,
102
 the doctrine only proves meaningful toward reconciliation if it 
brings about something more than using good manners to extinguish 
Aboriginal rights with a legislated “please” and “thank you”.103 Unless, of 
course, reconciliation means the wholesale capitulation by Aboriginal people 
in favour of the Crown and the settler population. One Dish required both 
Nations to approach each other not only with honour but as equals. That 
stated, the doctrine of honour offers some movement forward,
104
 and carries 
the potential to bring about change.  
In Haida Nation
105
 and Taku River
106
 the Court expanded the doctrine 
by moving it beyond merely a guidepost of conduct into substantive 
obligations through the duty to consult:
107
  
                                                                                                                                  
98  P. Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government and the Borders of the Canadian Legal 
Imagination” (1991) 36 McGill L.J. 382 [hereinafter “Macklem, ‘First Nations Self-Government’”]; 
Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13. 
99  P. Macklem, “What’s Law Got to Do With It? The Protection of Aboriginal Title in 
Canada” (1997) 35 Osgoode Hall L.J. 125. 
100  For more on the unsustainability of the relationship between Canada and Aboriginal 
people, see McNeil, “Constitutional Rights”, supra, note 61; W. Pentney, ”The Rights of the 
Aboriginal Peoples of Canada in the Constitution Act, 1982 Part II — Section 35: The Substantive 
Guarantee” (1988) 22 U.B.C. L. Rev. 207; and B. Slattery, “The Constitutional Guarantee of 
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights” (1982) 8 Queen’s L.J. 232. 
101  Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para. 17, quoting Van der Peet, supra, note 12, at para. 31:  
The historical roots of the principle of the honour of the Crown suggest that it must be 
understood generously in order to reflect underlying realities from which it stems. In all 
its dealing with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of sovereignty to the resolution of 
claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown must act honourably. Nothing less 
is required if we are to achieve “the reconciliation of the pre-existence of aboriginal 
societies with the sovereignty of the Crown”. 
102  Haida Nation, supra, note 16. 
103  B. Slattery, Ancestral Lands, Alien Laws: Judicial Perspectives on Aboriginal Title 
(Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 1983); and Asch, supra, note 34. 
104  B. Slattery, “A Taxonomy of Aboriginal Rights” in H. Foster, H. Raven & J. Webber, 
eds., Let Right Be Done: Calder, Aboriginal Title and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: 
University of British Columbia Press, 2011) Ch. 7 [hereinafter “Let Right Be Done”]; and Slattery, 
“Generative Structure”, supra, note 13. 
105  Haida Nation, supra, note 16. 
106  Taku River, supra, note 16. 
107  Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13. 
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Put simply, Canada’s Aboriginal peoples were here when Europeans 
came, and were never conquered. Many bands reconciled their claims 
with the sovereignty of the Crown through negotiated treaties. Others, 
notably in British Columbia, have yet to do so. The potential rights 
embedded in these claims are protected by s. 35 of the Constitution Act, 
1982. The honour of the Crown requires that these rights be determined, 
recognized and respected. This, in turn, requires the Crown, acting 
honourably, to participate in processes of negotiation. While this process 
continues, the honour of the Crown may require it to consult and, where 
indicated, accommodate Aboriginal interests.
108
  
However, in Haida Nation, the Court offered no analysis of how it 
arrived at its bold “never any doubt”109 acceptance of Crown sovereignty 
in Sparrow but rather quietly shifted its language, thereby again leaving 
reconciliation prospects slim.
110
 More explicitly, reconciliation premised 
on such colonial assumptions is not achievable.
111
 On a more positive side, 
in Taku River, the Court established that the doctrine of honour is neither a 
historical relic nor about good manners. It is the foundation of the 
relationship between the Crown and Aboriginal people in terms of both the 
treaties of the past and the agreements of the future.
112
 In addition to 
establishing section 35(1) as constitutional protection for Aboriginal rights 
and title, the Court also spent some time setting out a basis for negotiated 
resolution. In so doing, the Court furthered its thinking in Delgamuukw. 
With these cases there is acceptance that honour is necessary for not only 
building but maintaining relationships, and is fundamentally valuable for 
both the Crown and Aboriginal people.
113
  
                                                                                                                                  
108  Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para. 25 (emphasis added). 
109  In Sparrow, supra, note 60, the Court neatly sums up 15 years of s. 35(1) jurisprudence 
of accepting the acquisition of Crown sovereignty at para. 49: 
It is worth recalling that while British policy towards the native population was based on 
respect for their right to occupy their traditional lands, a proposition to which the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 bears witness, there was from the outset never any doubt that 
sovereignty and legislative power, and indeed the underlying title, to such lands vested 
with the Crown ... 
The Court had opportunity to more actively step away from the acceptance of Crown sovereignty. 
110  For more on the impact of the Crown’s assertion of sovereignty on Aboriginal people, 
see, Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30. 
111  P. Macklem, “Distributing Sovereignty: Indian Nations and Equality of Peoples” (1993) 
45 Stan. L. Rev. 1311. 
112  Taku River, supra, note 16, at para. 24: “In all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, the 
Crown must act honourably, in accordance with its historical and future relationship with the 
Aboriginal peoples in question.” 
113  S. Imai, “Creating Disincentives to Negotiate: Mitchell v. M.N.R’s Potential effect on 
Dispute Resolution” (2003) 22 Windsor Y.B. Access Just. 309. 
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In both Haida Nation and Taku River then, the Court is urging 
negotiated resolve of differences, which offers both the Crown and 
Aboriginal people opportunity so long as the negotiations are not 
reflective of past Crown policy on land claims, which would start from 
the premise that Aboriginal people must give something else up while the 
Crown counts further gains in its favour. If the element of honour is the 
starting place for the parties to approach each other, the Crown will also 
have to “recognize and respect” Aboriginal context and determine what 
the Crown is prepared to contribute to reconciliation. Such an action 
would be similar to what the Haudenosaunee and Anishinabe would have 
done to bring about One Dish.
114
 
Moreover, to achieve reconciliation the Crown must be prepared to 
sit at an inclusive nation-to-nation table that includes the Métis,
115
 who, 
“after having lived in the shadows for generations … slowly began to 
come out of hiding”.116 Section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 
defines “aboriginal peoples” as including Métis people,117 yet they have 
historically fallen in between
118
 — not Indian for the purposes of the 
Indian Act but not settlers either. There cannot be any denying that their 
history and relationship with the Crown is also one fraught with 
frustration,
119
 though so few constitutional cases have considered the 
Métis.
120
 Manitoba Metis
121
 expands the inclusivity of honour of the 
                                                                                                                                  
114  Corbiere, supra, note 24.  
115  For a historical background and government structures relating to Metis in Canada, see 
D. Purich, The Metis (Toronto: James Lorimer, 1988), and J. Madden, “The Metis Nations’ Self-
Government Agenda: Issues and Options for the Future” in F. Wilson & M. Mallet, eds., Metis-
Crown Relations: Rights, Identity, Jurisdiction, and Governance (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2008).  
116  J. Teillet, “The Métis and Thirty Years of Section 35: How Constitutional Protection for 
Métis Rights Has Led to the Loss of the Rule of Law” in J. Cameron & S. Lawrence, eds. (2012) 58 
S.C.L.R. (2d) 333, at 341 [hereinafter “Teillet”].  
117  Constitution, supra, note 2; C. Bell, “Who Are the Metis People in Section 35(2)” (1991) 
29 Alta. L. Rev. 351. The courts have likewise found that the word “Indian” in s. 91(24) includes the 
Metis: see Daniels v. Canada, [2013] F.C.J. No. 4, [2013] 2 F.C.R. 268 (F.C.), vard [2014] F.C.J. 
No. 383, 2014 FCA 101 (F.C.A.). 
118  See M.L. Stevenson, “Metis Aboriginal Rights and the ‘Core of Indianness’” (2004) 67 
Sask. L. Rev. 301; P. Chartrand, “Aboriginal Rights: The Dispossession of the Metis” (1991) 20 
Osgoode Hall L.J. 457; L.N. Chartrand, “Are We Metis or Are We Indians? A Commentary on R. v. 
Grumbo” (1999-2000) 13 Ottawa L. Rev. 267. 
119  For further discussion, see P. Chartrand & J. Goikas, “Defining ‘The Metis People’: The 
Hard Case of Canadian Aboriginal Law” in P. Chartrand, ed., Canada’s Aboriginal People 
(Saskatoon: Purich Publishing Ltd., 2002); and D. McMahon & F. Martin, “The Metis and 91(24): Is 
Inclusion the Issue?” in P. Macklem et al., Aboriginal Self-Government: Legal and Constitutional 
Issues (Ottawa: Department of Supply and Services Canada, 1995).  
120  Teillet, supra, note 116. 
121  Manitoba Metis, supra, note 92.  
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Crown.
122
 This decision is significant in that with Métis included in the 
application of the doctrine of honour, it “gives rise to a duty of diligent, 
purposive fulfillment”,123 of Crown conduct, which the Court will not be 
hesitant to determine.
124
  
The Crown’s argument was essentially that if there ever was a duty 
toward the Métis in Manitoba to provide lands, the claim is statute-barred 
or, alternatively, barred by the doctrine of laches.
125
 The Court rejected 
the Crown’s submission on the basis that it was inconsistent with 
reconciling the relationship between the Métis people and the Crown. By 
holding that the honour of the Crown was owed and continuing but not 
present in its dealings with the Métis, the Court demonstrated that it is 
prepared to be critical of constitutive moments in the formation of the 
country. Ultimately, Manitoba Metis scolds the Crown on its ethics while 
still not providing the Métis with a long-promised land base. In this way, 
the decision does not fully serve to uphold the “acts of mutual respect, 
                                                                                                                                  
122  Id., at para. 94. The Court states, at paras. 70 and 94: 
The application of these precedents to this case indicates that the honour of the Crown is 
also engaged by an explicit obligation to an Aboriginal group that is enshrined in the 
Constitution. The Constitution is not a mere statute; it is the very document by which the 
‘Crow[n] assert[ed its] sovereignty in the face of prior Aboriginal occupation’: Taku 
River, at para. 24. See also Mitchell v. M.N.R., 2001 SCC 33, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 911, at 
para. 9. It is at the root of the honour of the Crown, and an explicit obligation to an 
Aboriginal group placed therein engages the honour of the Crown at its core. As stated in 
Haida Nation, ‘[i]n all its dealings with Aboriginal peoples, from the assertion of 
sovereignty to the resolution of claims and the implementation of treaties, the Crown 
must act honourably’: para. 17 (emphasis added). 
... 
... In accordance with the principles outlined above, the honour of the Crown is engaged 
by s. 31 and gives rise to a duty of diligent, purposive fulfillment. 
123  Id., at para. 94. 
124  In dealing with the Crown’s position that it did not owe any obligations to the Métis of 
Manitoba under the terms of the Manitoba Act, the Court found, id., at para. 133: “We have 
concluded that Canada did not act diligently to fulfill the specific obligation to the Métis contained 
in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act, as required by the honour of the Crown.” 
125  The majority of the Court — to the vehement objection of the dissent — did not accept 
this position (Manitoba Metis, id., at paras. 135 and 139): 
Thus, this Court has found that limitations of actions statutes cannot prevent the courts, as 
guardians of the Constitution, from issuing declarations on the constitutionality of 
legislation. By extension, limitations acts cannot prevent the courts from issuing a 
declaration on the constitutionality of the Crown’s conduct. 
... 
However, at this point we are not concerned with an action for breach of fiduciary duty, 
but with a claim for a declaration that the Crown did not act honourably in implementing 
the constitutional obligation in s. 31 of the Manitoba Act. Limitations acts cannot bar 
claims of this nature. 
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tolerance and goodwill that serve to heal rifts and create the foundations 
for a harmonious relationship”.126  
The Court has already stated that the relationship between the Crown 
and Aboriginal people is ongoing and not limited to the times and dates 
of treaties or agreements.
127
 Recall too that the Royal Proclamation and 
subsequent cases reflect the Crown’s commitment to act honourably so 
as to “remove all reasonable Cause of Discontent” of the “Nations or 
Tribes of Indians with whom We are connected”.128 In Manitoba Metis, 
the Court has ensured that Métis people are part of those Nations or 
Tribes to which the Crown’s duty of honour is owed and that such a duty 
is fundamental to reconciliation. If Métis can meet the test for Aboriginal 
rights and title set out in Powley,
129
 which modified the tests in Sparrow 
and Van der Peet — and indeed the Métis have been doing so through a 
slowly growing body of jurisprudence
130
 — they should also be part of a 
reconciliation process. 
Manitoba Metis is about old relationships, broken promises and the 
substantive role honour plays in “negotiated settlements with good faith 
and a give and take on all sides”.131 The doctrine of honour is a legally 
enforceable obligation, not merely a notion of best practices when 
available in order to avoid sharp dealing by the Crown,
132
 meaning the 
Court has placed an importance on trust in the relationship, which is 
repeated in Mitchell
133
 and Little Salmon/Carmacks.
134
 As such, there is 
no reason to doubt the sincerity of the Chief Justice in prioritizing 
reconciliation. With both One Dish and section 35 jurisprudence agreeing 
that honour is required in order to establish trust, there is a mutual 
                                                                                                                                  
126  Walters, supra, note 5. 
127  Manitoba Metis, supra, note 92. 
128  Proclamation, supra, note 33. 
129  R. v. Powley, [2003] S.C.J. No. 43, [2003] 2 S.C.R. 207, 2003 SCC 43 (S.C.C.) modified 
the tests in Sparrow, supra, note 60 and Van der Peet, supra, note 12, by defining a 10-step test for 
Métis rights, including the right to hunt as an Aboriginal right.  
130  Teillet, supra, note 116; see also C. Bell, “Metis Constitutional Rights in Section 35(1)” 
(1997) 36 Alta. L. Rev. 180. 
131  Delgamuukw, supra, note 12, at para. 186. 
132  For more on “sharp dealing”, see R. v. Badger, [1996] S.C.J. No. 39, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 
771, at para. 41 (S.C.C.); R. v. Marshall, [1999] S.C.J. No. 55, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456, at para. 4 
(S.C.C.); Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para. 19; Manitoba Métis, supra, note 92, at para. 73. 
133  Supra, note 12, at para. 129, wherein the Court encourages Aboriginal and non-
Aboriginal Canadians to work together for common purpose.  
134  Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra, note 89; and Manitoba Metis, supra, note 93, at paras. 
97-98, where the Court encourages a harmonious co-existence of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal 
Canadians based on trust. 
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opening toward reconciliation and fertile ground to negotiate a new 
relationship.  
2.  Consultation  
Effectively reconciling a relationship “carries with it the processes 
that are needed to overcome a culture of suspicion, mistrust and fear”.135 
Thus, it is also the process
136
 and the building of principles
137
 necessary 
to bring about resolution that are also vitally important. The parties to 
One Dish had neither a common culture nor a common language. Still 
they managed to engage in diplomatic discussions with each other in 
order to come to terms. It would have taken rounds of consultation with 
the parties both internal to each Nation and with each other prior to 
coming to agreement.
138
 Haida Nation declares that “[t]he government’s 
duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples and accommodate their interests 
is grounded in the honour of the Crown”,139 which is echoed in Taku 
River.
140
 In the end though, in Haida Nation, the Court determined that 
the duty was met on the facts
141
 and again fell short of offering a more 
                                                                                                                                  
135  Tzimas, supra, note 8, at 524. 
136  For a more in-depth discussion on possible steps of process, see S.F. Du Toit, “Tensions 
Between Human Rights and the Politics of Reconciliation: A South African Case Study” in Joanna 
R. Quinn, ed., Reconciliation(s): Transitional Justice in Postconflict Societies (Montreal and 
Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2009). 
137  Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13, sets out six Principles of Reconciliation, 
which “must have the following basic features”:  
(1) They should acknowledge the historical rights of aboriginal peoples, as determined by 
Principles of Recognition, as the essential starting point for any modern settlement. 
(2) They should take account of how historical aboriginal rights have been affected by 
changes in the circumstances of indigenous peoples and the rise of third-party and 
other social interests. 
(3) Where appropriate, they should distinguish between the “inner core” of aboriginal 
rights, which may be implemented by the courts without need for negotiation, and a 
“penumbra” or “outer range” that needs to be defined in treaties negotiated between 
the aboriginal people concerned and the Crown. 
(4) They should provide guidelines governing the accommodation of rights and interests 
held by other affected groups, both aboriginal and non-aboriginal. 
(5) Where appropriate, they should create strong incentives for negotiated settlements to 
be reached within a reasonable period of time.  
(6) They should provide for judicial remedies where negotiations fail to yield a settlement.  
138  Corbiere, supra, note 24.  
139  Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para.16. 
140  Taku River, supra, note 16. 
141  Newman, supra, note 3, at 475-91. 
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level playing field suitable for equals.
142
 Declaring that the Crown’s duty 
to consult with Aboriginal people continues beyond what was written in 
a treaty and that the duty is ongoing helps in establishing the enduring 
nature of the relationship between Aboriginal people and the Crown. In 
short, through consultation comes the context which was so important in 
the subsequent interpretation of the Royal Proclamation, but which has 
been ignored.  
Moreover, these cases confirm that the Crown has a constitutionally 
entrenched duty to consult with Aboriginal people.
143
 If we are to share the 
bounty and reconcile long-standing disputes, consultation is the means by 
which this process will happen. Consultation must be engaged in by the 
Crown for the benefit of the long-term life of the relationship and consider 
the way that practices and material conditions will shift during the life of 
the parties and agreements. The interpretation of the Aboriginal 
perspective must be done in a generative way that ultimately allows for 
Aboriginal rights to operate “on two levels – the first, abstract and 
timeless; the second concrete and timebound”.144 In this way, the Crown’s 
consultative approach must be inclusive of Aboriginal perspectives, 
eschew hierarchy and establish trust. With trust comes the possibility of a 
reordered relationship of equals, a nation-to-nation relationship.  
Though the case was dismissed on procedural grounds, the Court 
signalled in obiter in Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd.
145
 its interest in 
defining Aboriginal collective and individual rights — such as who has 
                                                                                                                                  
142  In Haida Nation, supra, note 16, the Court was not prepared to rebalance the power between 
Aboriginal people and the Crown. Further by finding Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation held no veto 
power and in Taku River, the Court was expressly clear that the duty to consult does not carry a veto 
power for Aboriginal people. Unfortunately, this leaves the relationship very one-sided in favour of the 
Crown who may in the end proceed at will with at best a delay by Aboriginal concerns.  
143  Slattery, “Generative Structure”, supra, note 13, at 437.  
144  Id., at 443. 
145  Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., [2013] S.C.J. No. 26, 2013 SCC 26 (S.C.C.) sends out 
an invitation that the doctrine of honour and the duty to consult as it relates to Aboriginal  
peoples’ collective rights may be tightly intertwined. Writing for a unanimous Court, LeBel J. stated  
(at paras. 32 and 33): 
The Behns also challenge the legality of the Authorizations on the basis that they breach 
their rights to hunt and trap under Treaty No. 8. This is an important issue, but a definitive 
pronouncement in this regard cannot be made in the circumstances of this case. I would 
caution against doing so at this stage of the proceedings and of the development of the law. 
... It is true that Aboriginal and treaty rights are collective in nature … However, certain 
rights, despite being held by the Aboriginal community, are nonetheless exercised by 
individual members or assigned to them. These rights may therefore have both collective 
and individual aspects. Individual members of a community may have a vested interest in 
the protection of these rights. It may well be that, in appropriate circumstances, individual 
members can assert certain Aboriginal or treaty rights. ...  
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the legal right to bring a claim on behalf of an Aboriginal community or 
who may assert an Aboriginal right. In the context of reconciliation, this 
invitation should be well heeded by all concerned. Based on the Court’s 
leanings, there is a real risk of future restrictions — exclusion even — as 
to whom the Court views as having the right to determine the rules of 
any One Dish-style agreement.
146
 Reconciliation will be elusive if not all 
Aboriginal groups are able to participate in a consultative process meant 
to draw everyone in.
147
 How collective and individual rights may be held 
and who may assert them is a sensitive issue for Aboriginal people, who 
continuously reject the limitations already imposed by Crown 
sovereignty, whether acquired or de facto or de jure,
148
 and may be best 
answered generously, if at all, to avoid additional potential to splinter 
relations.  
Both “honour” and “consultation” have been used as a justification 
for diminishing Aboriginal and treaty rights in favour of Crown 
sovereignty. If reconciliation really matters, then manipulating honour 
and consultation to subvert Aboriginal rights in favour of the settler 
population cannot continue. Instead, these elements should be recast in 
keeping with the example the Haudenosaunee and Anishinabe offer with 
One Dish and should be used not as a vehicle to uphold a colonial myth 
of sovereignty, but rather as a means to equalize the parties and set the 
relationship right. 
3.  Restraint 
Another key principle of One Dish revolves around the question of 
restraint. Had either the Anishinabe or Haudenosaunee opted to take 
more than their share, the bowl would have tipped and equilibrium 
would have been lost. This may pose a greater challenge to the Crown, 
which continues to rely on a hierarchical ordering of rights, with Crown 
supremacy to be the basis for legal argument as we have seen in 
Sparrow and reflected throughout section 35(1) jurisprudence. Again, 
the Manitoba Metis decision, wherein the Crown is called out for 
                                                                                                                                  
146  The use of a common bowl metaphor is also used in other ways relating to sharing 
by the Nisga’a. For more on this, see H. Foster, H. Raven & J. Webber, eds., Right Be 
Done: Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights  (Vancouver: 
UBC Press, 2011), at 220. 
147  M. Walters, supra, note 5, at 180. 
148  For more on de facto versus de jure Crown sovereignty, see Slattery, “Generative 
Structure”, supra, note 13. 
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failing to uphold the doctrine of honour, indicates that the passage of 
time will not bar future claims, meaning that there should be interest by 
the Crown in finding new ways forward. It is more effective for the 
Crown to manage its own restraint
149
 and not to take too much from 
already strained relationships, rather than waiting for legal claims, which 
may be brought at any time, to challenge the Crown taking more than it 
should.  
Aboriginal laws are instructive in achieving restraint “through 
intersocietal activities between First Nations to bridge division and 
discord”.150 Take the Haudenosaunee, for example, who pre-contact had 
laws and protocols in place in the event of a threat to resources or 
lands.
151
 Such means included “wider systems of diplomacy”152 and 
intersocietal norms
153
 that functioned as preventative measures meant to 
demonstrate restraint and avoid harm. The Anishinabe made use of 
“peace-keeping warriors, or Ogijidah … to patrol and monitor such sites 
of conflict, and perhaps even occupy a contested site. … These tools 
were embedded in a wider framework of law.”154 In this way, the parties 
to One Dish teach us about achieving restraint through proactive means 
rather than waiting for conflict to erupt and accessing a colonial legal 
system for post-conflict redress.  
4.  Maintenance 
Finally, the regular renewal of One Dish between the Anishinabe and 
the Haudenosaunee contributed considerably to its ongoing success. By 
gathering together regularly and sharing the very bounty subject to One 
Dish, the two Nations were able to reaffirm the preceding three elements 
along with the solemnity of One Dish
155
 and transmit One Dish’s 
importance to younger generations. The Court understands this in 
                                                                                                                                  
149  J. Borrows, “Indian Agency and Taking What’s Not Yours” (2003) 22 Windsor Y.B. 
Access Just. 253.  
150  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 130. 
151  Y. Richmond, D. Richter & J.H. Merrell, Beyond the Covenant Chain: The Iroquois and 
Their Neighbors in Indian North America, 1600-1800 (University Park, PA: Penn State University 
Press, 2003) [hereinafter “Beyond the Covenant Chain”].  
152  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 130. 
153  Webber, supra, note 88. 
154  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26.  
155  O. Lyons, “Spirituality, Equality, and Natural Law” in L. Little Bear, M. Boldt & J.A. 
Long, eds., Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian Indians and the Canadian State (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1984), at 5-6 [hereinafter “Lyons”]. 
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identifying ongoing maintenance as a requirement for successful 
relationships. In Little Salmon/Carmacks and Quebec (Attorney General) 
v. Moses, the Court held that treaties — including so-called modern ones 
— require ongoing maintenance to avoid disagreement.156 In Mikisew 
Cree First Nation v. Canada (Minister of Canadian Heritage),
157
 the 
Court tells us that even the pre-Confederation treaties must be 
continuously renewed:  
... Treaty making is an important stage in the long process of 
reconciliation, but is it only a stage. What occurred at Fort Chipewyan 
in 1899 was not the complete discharge of the duty arising from the 
honour of the Crown but a rededication of it.  
... 
In summary, the 1899 negotiations [for Treaty 8] were the first step in a 
long journey that is unlikely to end any time soon. ...
158
 
The element of maintenance was vitally important from an 
Aboriginal perspective at the Treaty of Niagara insofar as spirituality is 
infused into sacred agreements.
159
 In particular, “the primary law of 
Indian government is the spiritual law ... our spirituality is directly 
involved in government … [s]o we are told first to conduct the 
ceremonies on time, in the proper manner, and then sit in council.”160 
The British Crown committed to “entering into treaties with Indigenous 
peoples if their lands were to be occupied by non-Aboriginal people. 
Indigenous peoples’ actions and perspectives were important to this 
policy formulation.”161 Subsequently, treaty negotiations were complex, 
involved and accompanied by diplomatic rules established by 
Aboriginal people. The Crown had to follow the rules or risk further 
fighting.
162
 At the formulation of the Covenant Chain of Friendship,
163
 
responsibilities were assigned, rules established and “a multinational 
                                                                                                                                  
156  Little Salmon/Carmacks, supra, note 89, at para. 46, and Quebec (Attorney General) v. 
Moses, [2010] S.C.J. No. 17, 2010 SCC 17, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 557, at para. 61 (S.C.C.).  
157  [2005] S.C.J. No. 71, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 388 (S.C.C.). 
158  Id., at paras. 54 and 56. 
159  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 161. 
160  Lyons, supra, note 155, at 5-6. 
161  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 133.  
162  Id., at 158, wherein he notes that the Crown’s failure to follow diplomatic protocol and 
exchange gifts during treaty negotiations resulted in Pontiac resuming fighting in 1764. 
163  R.L. Haan, “Covenant and Consensus, Iroquois and English, 1676-1760” in Beyond the 
Covenant Chain, supra, note 151, at 41. Also note that the Covenant Chain of Friendship formed 
part of the Treaty of Niagara.  
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alliance in which no member gave up their sovereignty, was affirmed. 
The Royal Proclamation became a treaty.”164 Through the Covenant 
Chain of Friendship, wampum was given,
165
 just as it was with One Dish. 
Moreover, the Anishinabe and Haudenosaunee gathered together at timed 
intervals to participate in ceremony and transmit the laws of One Dish to 
all in attendance so that the treaty would continue to be respected and 
peace would continue to reign.
166
 Maintenance then, is the means by 
which the relationship continues to thrive in the long term. For the 
Crown and Aboriginal people this may possibly take the form of annual 
meetings that involve ceremony, the exchange of gifts and discussions 
that seek to reaffirm the relationship and address concerns arising in a 
modern context.
167
  
V. FINDING A WAY ... TOGETHER 
“[W]e are all here to stay.”168 The relationship between the Crown 
and Aboriginal people can only be reconciled by also taking Indigenous 
approaches to law
169
 into account.
170
 The Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples
171
 considered this question in an intersocietal law 
paradigm and suggested a new Royal Proclamation, one that creates a 
path forward to a new relationship and corrects the historical record — 
one that is more in keeping with both Crown and Aboriginal perspectives 
originally folded into the Treaty of Niagara. The Treaty included both an  
 
                                                                                                                                  
164  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, at 161.  
165  Id. 
166  Corbiere, supra, note 24.  
167  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30, Laying the Foundations of a 
New Relationship, Vol. 5, makes a number of recommendations toward restructuring the relationship 
for the long term.  
168  Delgamuukw, supra, note 12, at para. 186. 
169  For more on Indigenous approaches to law as sacred, see H. Cardinal & W. Hildebandt, 
Treaty Elders of Saskatchewan: Our Dream Is That Our Peoples Will One Day Be Clearly 
Recognized as Nations (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 2000).  
170  R. Dworkin, Justice in Robes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2006). Dworkin 
suggests that both existing jurisprudence and its moral soundness are two fundamental elements 
of a decision’s fit within an overall legal landscape. With the Court’s reliance on a colonialist 
structure — and thereby morally suspect — considering Dworkin’s approach, reconciliation may 
not be achieved without a considerable change in law and a more morally sound approach, such 
as respecting Aboriginal people’s own laws (which was also at issue in the Tsilhqot’in case, 
supra, note 55).  
171  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30, Vol. 5, Renewal: A Twenty-Year 
Commitment. 
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English written text of the Royal Proclamation, 1763 and a wampum belt 
that were intended to be read together. For this new venture to succeed, 
there must be a “rejection of the doctrine of discovery”172 on the grounds 
that it is “legally, morally and factually wrong”.173 
If One Dish is a worthy means of recasting the relationship and a 
model of how to go about achieving reconciliation, the courts and the 
ideology of One Dish are not entirely oppositional. Jointly, they offer a 
common starting point with honour and a consultative process, if used 
effectively and fully in negotiations, that takes both sides into account to 
create something new. One Dish offers one option to reconcile the 
relationship by reshaping it from vertical to horizontal, unbalanced to 
equal, acrimonious to harmonized, hierarchical to circular. In other 
words, One Dish, and its ongoing maintenance, may make the 
relationships flexible enough to accommodate everyone for the long 
term. It asks us to expand our legal imagination to make room
174
 as we 
gather together at one table, share one bounty and take what we need, no 
more, no less. One Dish’s elements are in keeping with Court doctrine 
and are broad enough to allow for a more cohesive view of reconciliation 
that may replace frustration with assumed Crown sovereign authority 
with trust. One Dish does not require either the Crown or Aboriginal 
people to entirely reinvent themselves; but rather, recasts what is meant 
by reconciliation, and allows for a drawing together to build an 
agreement that will govern a relationship where the parties are not 
separate but equal, but rather, equal and together.  
Reconciliation is more than just a notional idea. What the Chief 
Justice is stating, through defining reconciliation as a key objective of 
section 35, is a principle also fundamental to One Dish. The relationship 
between Canada and Aboriginal people is ongoing and must be tended. 
There should not ever be a time when the relationship closes.
175
 One 
Dish supports the definition of “reconciliation as relationship” approach 
offered by Walters. It is about cooperation, balance, equality and respect. 
Much has happened in the Court to define Aboriginal constitutional 
rights as the Court cuts a wide, seemingly meandering path, towards  
                                                                                                                                  
172  Borrows, “(Ab)Originalism”, supra, note 9, at 370.  
173  Id.; see also Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30, Vol. 1, at 696.  
174  Macklem, “First Nations Self-Government, supra, note 98. The author argues for the 
need to reconceptualize Anglo-Canadian norms, legal principles and assumptions that have colluded 
to create a structure that limits the legal imagination with respect to the relationship between the 
Crown and Aboriginal People. I posit that One Dish presents such a reconceptualization. 
175  Haida Nation, supra, note 16, at para 54. 
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(as the Court claims), reconciliation.
176
 The jurisprudence indicates that the 
Court has done some lifting, but is it enough? The enduring acceptance of 
Crown sovereign authority in section 35 jurisprudence to date will 
continue to destabilize efforts
177
 to negotiate agreements intended to pave 
the way to reconciliation. Similarly, as we have seen, the Court has not 
developed a clear process that operationalizes the reconciliation purpose of 
section 35(1), and can be relied upon for smoothing out relations.
178
 Yet, 
constitutions are supposed to assist people in making sound decisions about 
how they will live together within a shared territory.
179
 For the relationship 
to work, a new approach is required,
180
 one that allows constitutional space 
for “aboriginal people to be aboriginal”.181 Presently, the law is decided by 
judges at a nine-sided table without a single Aboriginal jurist in sight. Can 
such a court be ready to consider alternatives and broaden the meaning of 
reconciliation so that it works for Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Canadians 
alike?
182
 Given the state of the relationship and the Chief Justice’s priority 
for the Court, a different approach should be welcomed.  
In the end, when it comes to reconciliation, it is helpful to recall that 
the relationship has been going on for centuries and is a long game. 
Through discussion, negotiation and even arguments, we will find our 
way to reconciliation so long as we come together to share with purpose. 
If we do anything less, the original dispossession of Aboriginal people 
through the simple acceptance of Crown sovereignty and a lopsided 
approach to section 35, is something everyone should be afraid of. 
Through open, level and fair negotiations, as the Court suggests, Canada 
has a chance to come into its own. In all of these pursuits, some hope can 
                                                                                                                                  
176  K. McNeil, “Judicial Approaches in Self-Government since Calder: Searching for 
Doctrinal Coherence” in Let Right Be Done, supra, note 104, Ch. 8. 
177  M. Asch, “From Calder to Van der Peet: Aboriginal Rights and Canadian Law, 1973-96” 
in P. Havemann, ed., Indigenous Peoples’ Rights in Australia, Canada and New Zealand (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1999).  
178  R. MacDonald, Lessons for Everyday Law (Montreal: McGill University Press, 2002), 
offers an excellent discussion with respect to considering ways to discern patterns and roles in the 
law. He posits that such a grand view is achieved through the examination of conflicts and legal 
interactions over time, in other words, a long game.  
179  Borrows, Indigenous Constitution, supra, note 26, Ch. 7.  
180  V. Napoleon, “Thinking About Indigenous Legal Orders” (2007), National Centre for 
First Nations Governance.  
181  Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, supra, note 30, in Partners in Confederation: 
Aboriginal Peoples, Self-Government and the Constitution (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 
1993), at 41.  
182  W. Alford, “On the Limits of ‘Grand Theory’ in Comparative Law” (1986) 61 Wash. L. 
Rev. 945.  
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be found in the jurisprudence, which when combined with One Dish, has 
much to offer to intersocietal law that at its best will endure. 
Living in Anishinabe territory, I have been taught not only to give 
thanks for the food we eat, but also to end thanksgiving with the words 
“all my relations”. This phrase serves as a gentle reminder of our place in 
the world and how we are inextricably linked to all life around us. It is 
meant to confirm, whether we care to admit it or not, that we all sit at one 
table, share one bowl and eat together with one spoon. It is beneficial for 
all concerned that sooner, not later, we find a way to reconcile the 
relationship between Canada and Aboriginal people in a way that is 
meaningful to all parties and to make it work. After all, we are bound up 
in a long game and have to get through this together. Let us face it, we 
are all here to stay. All my relations. 
 
